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Abstract:	  Were	  we	  just	  the	  Darwinian	  adaptive	  survival/reproduction	  machines	  Von	  Hippel	  &	  Trivers	  invoke	  to	  explain	  us,	  the	  self-­‐deception	  problem	  would	  not	  only	  be	  simpler	  but	  non-­‐existent.	  Why	  would	  unconscious	  robots	  bother	  to	  misinform	  themselves	  so	  as	  to	  misinform	  others	  more	  effectively?	  But	  as	  we	  are	  indeed	  conscious	  rather	  than	  unconscious	  robots,	  the	  problem	  is	  explaining	  the	  causal	  role	  of	  consciousness	  itself,	  not	  just	  its	  supererogatory	  tendency	  to	  misinform	  itself	  so	  as	  to	  misinform	  (or	  perform)	  better.	   
 Von	  Hippel	  &	  Trivers	  (VH	  &	  T)	  are	  deceiving	  themselves	  -­‐-­‐	  with	  the	  help	  of	  adaptivist	  psychodynamics	  and	  a	  Darwinian	  Unconscious.	  They	  have	  not	  proposed	  an	  adaptive	  function	  for	  self-­‐deception;	  they	  have	  merely	  clad	  adaptive	  interpersonal	  behaviour	  in	  a	  non-­‐explanatory	  mentalistic	  interpretation:	   I	  can	  persuade	  you	  more	  convincingly	  that	  I	  am	  unafraid	  of	  you	  (or	  better	  fool	  you	  into	  thinking	  that	  the	  treasure	  is	  on	  the	  right	  rather	  than	  the	  left,	  where	  it	  really	  is)	  if	  I	  am	  unaware	  of	  -­‐-­‐	  or	  "forget"	  -­‐-­‐	  my	  own	  fear	  (or	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  treasure	  is	  really	  on	  the	  left	  rather	  than	  the	  right).	   Sure.	  But	  then	  in	  what	  sense	  am	  I	  afraid	  at	  all	  (or	  aware	  where	  the	  treasure	  really	  is)?	  If	  I	  feel	  (hence	  act)	  afraid,	  then	  you	  detect	  it.	  If	  I	  don't	  feel	  the	  fear	  (or	  the	  sinistroversive	  urge),	  then	  I	  don't	  act	  afraid,	  and	  you	  don't	  detect	  any	  fear	  (because	  there’s	  nothing	  there	  to	  detect).	  	   So	  in	  what	  sense	  am	  I	  "self-­‐deceived"?	  (Ditto	  for	  left/right.)	  Is	  it	  always	  self-­‐deception	  not	  to	  feel	  afraid	  (or	  not	  to	  remember	  that	  the	  treasure's	  on	  the	  right),	  when	  I	  "ought	  to"	  (or	  used	  to)?	   
The	  same	  is	  true	  of	  "self-­‐enhancement":	  Yes,	  I	  am	  more	  convincing	  to	  others,	  hence	  more	  influential	  on	  their	  behaviour,	  if	  I	  behave	  as	  if	  I	  expect	  to	  succeed	  (even	  when	  I	  have	  no	  objective	  grounds	  for	  the	  expectation).	  But	  in	  what	  sense	  am	  I	  self-­‐deceived?	  In	  feeling	  brave	  and	  confident,	  when	  I	  "ought	  to"	  be	  feeling	  fearful	  and	  pessimistic?	  Shouldn't	  organisms	  all	  simply	  be	  behaving	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  maximize	  their	  adaptive	  chances?	   In	  fact,	  what	  does	  what	  organisms	  feel	  have	  to	  do	  with	  any	  of	  this	  at	  all	  (apart	  from	  the	  entirely	  unexplained	  fact	  that	  they	  do	  indeed	  feel,	  that	  their	  feelings	  are	  indeed	  correlated	  with	  their	  adaptive	  behaviour,	  and	  that	  their	  feelings	  do	  indeed	  feel	  causal	  to	  them)?	  The	  feelings	  themselves	  (i.e,	  consciousness)	  is	  much	  harder	  to	  situate	  in	  the	  adaptive	  causal	  explanation	  -­‐-­‐	  unless	  you	  believe	  in	  telekinesis	  (Harnad	  2000)!	  (Hence	  I	  feel	  that	  VH	  &	  T	  have	  bitten	  off	  a	  lot	  more	  here,	  phenomenally,	  than	  they	  can	  ever	  hope	  to	  chew,	  functionally.) The	  treasure	  is	  the	  best	  example	  of	  all,	  because	  that	  is	  about	  facts	  (data)	  rather	  than	  just	  feelings:	  Suppose	  I	  did	  indeed	  “know”	  at	  some	  point	  that	  the	  treasure	  was	  on	  the	  left	  -­‐-­‐	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  if	  at	  that	  point	  I	  could	  have	  reached	  for	  it	  without	  risk	  of	  being	  attacked	  by	  you,	  I	  would	  have	  reached	  for	  it	  on	  the	  left.	  But,	  according	  to	  VH	  &	  T,	  it	  was	  adaptive	  for	  me	  to	  "forget"	  where	  the	  treasure	  really	  was,	  and	  to	  believe	  (and	  behave	  as	  if)	  it	  was	  on	  the	  right	  rather	  than	  the	  left,	  so	  as	  to	  deceive	  you	  into	  heading	  off	  to	  the	  right	  so	  I	  could	  eventually	  grab	  the	  treasure	  on	  the	  left	  and	  dart	  off	  with	  it.	   But	  isn't	  the	  true	  adaptive	  design	  problem	  for	  the	  Blind	  Watchmaker	  –	  apart	  from	  the	  untouched	  problem	  of	  how	  and	  why	  we	  feel	  at	  all	  (Harnad	  1995)	  -­‐-­‐	  a	  lot	  simpler	  here	  than	  we	  are	  making	  it	  out	  to	  be	  (Harnad	  2002)?	  And	  are	  we	  not	  deceiving	  ourselves	  when	  we	  "adapt"	  the	  adaptive	  explanation	  so	  as	  to	  square	  with	  our	  subjective	  experience?	   All	  that's	  needed	  for	  adaptive	  cognition	  and	  behaviour	  is	  information	  (i.e.,	  data).	  To	  be	  able	  to	  retrieve	  the	  treasure,	  	  what	  I	  (or	  rather	  my	  brain)	  must	  have	  have	  is	  reliable	  data	  on	  where	  the	  treasure	  really	  is	  -­‐-­‐	  on	  the	  left	  or	  the	  right.	  Likewise,	  in	  order	  to	  get	  you	  to	  head	  off	  toward	  the	  right,	  leaving	  the	  treasure	  to	  me,	  I	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  behave	  exactly	  as	  if	  I	  had	  information	  to	  the	  effect	  that	  it	  was	  on	  the	  right	  rather	  than	  the	  left	  (or	  as	  if	  I	  had	  no	  information	  at	  all).	  Adaptive	  "mind-­‐reading"	  (sensu	  Premack	  	  &	  Woodruff	  1978),	  after	  all,	  is	  just	  behavioral-­‐intention-­‐reading	  and	  information-­‐possession-­‐reading.	  It's	  not	  really	  telepathy.	   Nor	  does	  it	  need	  to	  be.	  Insofar	  as	  the	  putative	  adaptive	  value	  of	  self-­‐deception	  in	  interpersonal	  interactions	  is	  concerned,	  an	  adaptive	  behaviourist	  (who	  has	  foolishly	  -­‐-­‐	  and	  falsely	  -­‐-­‐	  deceived	  himself	  into	  denying	  the	  existence	  of	  consciousness)	  could	  easily	  explain	  every	  single	  one	  of	  VH	  &	  T's	  examples	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  adaptive	  value	  of	  mere	  deception	  -­‐-­‐	  behavioural	  deception	  -­‐-­‐	  of	  other	  organisms. And	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  true	  "self-­‐deception"	  -­‐-­‐	  do	  I	  really	  have	  to	  forget	  where	  the	  treasure	  actually	  is	  in	  order	  to	  successfully	  convince	  either	  you	  or	  me	  of	  something	  
that	  is	  adaptive	  for	  me?	  Well,	  there	  the	  only	  reason	  VH	  &	  T	  would	  seem	  to	  have	  a	  leg	  up	  on	  the	  blinkered	  adaptive	  behaviourist	  is	  that	  VH	  &	  T	  do	  not	  deceive	  themselves	  into	  denying	  consciousness	  (Harnad	  2003).	  But	  what	  VH	  &	  T	  completely	  fail	  to	  do,	  is	  to	  explain	  (1)	  what	  causal	  role	  consciousness	  (feeling)	  itself	  performs	  in	  our	  adaptive	  success,	  let	  alone	  (2)	  what	  second-­‐order	  causal	  role	  consciousness	  might	  need	  to	  perform	  in	  the	  kind	  of	  peekaboo	  game	  individual	  organisms	  sometimes	  seem	  to	  play	  with	  themselves.	  Both	  remain	  just	  as	  unexplained	  as	  they	  were	  before,	  and	  the	  first	  	  (1)	  is	  the	  harder	  problem,	  hence	  the	  one	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  solved	  first	  (Harnad	  &	  Scherzer	  2008).	   Might	  self-­‐deception	  rather	  be	  a	  form	  of	  anosognosia,	  where	  our	  brains	  are	  busy	  making	  do	  with	  whatever	  informational	  and	  behavioural	  resources	  they	  have	  at	  their	  disposal,	  with	  no	  spare	  time	  to	  deceive	  us	  (inexplicably)	  into	  feeling	  that	  we're	  doing	  what	  we're	  doing	  because	  we	  feel	  like	  it? Apart	  from	  that,	  it’s	  simple	  to	  explain,	  adaptively,	  why	  people	  lie,	  cheat	  and	  steal	  (or	  try	  to	  overachieve,	  against	  the	  odds,	  or	  avoid	  untoward	  data):	  It’s	  because	  it	  works,	  when	  it	  works.	  It’s	  much	  harder	  to	  explain	  why	  we	  don’t	  deceive,	  when	  we	  don’t,	  than	  why	  we	  do,	  when	  we	  do.	  	  We	  usually	  distinguish	  between	  the	  sociopaths,	  who	  deceive	  without	  feeling	  (or	  showing)	  any	  qualms,	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  us.	  Have	  sociopaths	  deceived	  themselves	  about	  what’s	  right	  and	  wrong,	  confusing	  true	  and	  false	  with	  being	  whatever	  it	  takes	  to	  get	  what	  one	  wants,	  whereas	  the	  rest	  of	  us	  are	  keeping	  the	  faith?	  Or	  are	  they	  just	  better	  Method	  Actors	  than	  the	  rest	  of	  us? 
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